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This paper considers the macroeconomic effects of the migration that followed the 
enlargement of the EU in May 2004. At that time the EU was expanded to include 10 
New Member States (NMS) predominantly from Central and Eastern Europe. In the 
wake of accession the number of workers migrating to the EU-15 from the poorest of 
the NMS increased significantly. In part the result of the liberal immigration policies 
adopted, and restrictive policies adopted elsewhere, Ireland and the UK have become 
popular destination countries for NMS workers. Here we illustrate the potential 
macroeconomic consequences of these migration flows across Europe, highlighting 
the impacts in both the receiving and sending countries. 
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Introduction 
 
The expansion of the EU in May 2004 to include 10 New Member States (NMS) 
made it possible for workers in some Central and Eastern European countries to take 
up work in the EU-15. Some East to West migration was anticipated as a consequence 
of EU enlargement due to the income gap between most EU-15 and NMS countries. 
However, the pattern of immigration across the EU-15 has turned out differently from 
expected; in part because of transitional restrictions on labour mobility imposed in 
many of the EU-15 countries (see e.g. Boeri and Brücker, 2005). Here we illustrate 
the potential macroeconomic impacts of the migration flows that are likely to have 
come as a result of EU enlargement. Clearly it is difficult to measure what migration 
might have happened had the EU enlargement in May 2004 not taken place, and 
hence to measure the change in migration from EU enlargement. This is for two 
reasons. First, there are relatively few data available on migration post enlargement to 
be able to disentangle an explicit EU enlargement effect. Second, the data that exist 
are not necessarily comparable, across countries and time, or comprehensive. Bearing 
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these considerations in mind, we construct a set of numbers intended to mimic the 
change in migration from EU enlargement. Next, taking these migration patterns as 
given, we assess the macroeconomic implications of these changes. Thus we do not 
consider any feedback from changes in income differentials and employment across 
countries to migration itself, which seems reasonable given that the macroeconomic 
consequences are generally relatively small.  
 
We illustrate the potential scale of migration effects on GDP, inflation, 
unemployment, productivity, the current account balance, and GDP per capita 
allowing for different assumptions about the labour market characteristics of 
immigrants versus natives and of emigrants who return to their home country versus 
the rest of the home country population. We consider how the macroeconomic effects 
of migration depend on the structure of the sending and receiving economies, but also 
the skill composition and the nature of migration, in particular whether it is temporary 
or permanent. Our tool for analysis is the National Institute Global Econometric 
Model (NiGEM), which includes fully specified country models for most European 
countries.  
 
The next section describes the magnitude of population movements between the 
Central and Eastern European NMS and EU-15 countries that might be described as 
directly related to the enlargement of the EU that took place on 1 May 2004. 
Importantly, although somewhat obviously, this differs from estimates of the 
population of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries, many of which arrived in advance 
of accession. Thereafter we discuss a simple simulation exercise using NiGEM that 
illustrates the macroeconomic impacts of these population movements. In this 
exercise cross country differences arise primarily from differences in the size of the 
shock, although other structural factors also prove to be important. The section that 
follows illustrates the sensitivity of the macroeconomic impacts of EU enlargement 
and migration in general to different assumptions about the migrant population, and 
discusses the importance of remittances and learning effects for the impacts on the 
source countries. A final section offers some conclusions. 
 
 
EU enlargement and migration 
 
The majority of the EU-15 countries have imposed immigration restrictions on NMS 
nationals, which effectively mean that the legislative barriers facing NMS nationals 
wanting to work or take up residence in these countries are little different following 
the enlargement of the EU in May 2004. Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK are 
the only four countries that allowed NMS workers to move relatively freely across 
national boundaries upon accession.1 Based on the data available one year after the 
eastward expansion of the EU, Boeri and Brücker (2005) suggest that the immigration 
restrictions imposed by the majority of the EU-15 resulted in the diversion of NMS 
migrants from the traditional destination countries that border the NMS, that is 
Austria, Germany and Italy, to the EU-15 countries with more liberal immigration 
policies. The data available to date reinforce that conclusion.   
 
                                                 
1 Limits on free labour mobility can be imposed for a maximum of 7 years and are to be reviewed 2 and 
5 years after accession. Following the 2 year review Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain removed all 
restrictions on NMS workers and 6 other EU-15 countries adopted more liberal policies.  
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Table 1 shows estimates of the change since EU enlargement to the end of the third 
quarter of 2006 in the number of NMS nationals or residents born in the NMS in 
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK, the four countries that adopted a relatively 
open door policy towards migrants. In the few years before accession the number of 
NMS nationals in these countries was broadly stable or rising relatively slowly, such 
that it might be reasonable to assume that the change in the NMS population in these 
countries since then provides an estimate of the effect of EU enlargement on net 
migration over this period, against a counterfactual of no enlargement. We note that 
these data are compiled from a variety of sources and involve a number of 
assumptions.2  
 
The numbers in Table 1 suggest relatively little impact of EU enlargement on 
immigration into the two Scandinavian countries considered, certainly in comparison 
to the two English speaking countries shown.3 Ireland in particular has experienced a 
large change in the number of NMS nationals present of 1.5 per cent of the total 
population and assuming that these are all of working age of 2.2 per cent of the 
working age population. By far the most popular destination for NMS emigrants to 
the EU-15 seems to be the UK, but relative to population size the impact appears 
much smaller than for Ireland.  
 
The UK has seen strong immigration since the end of the last decade, when the annual 
net migration flow to the UK rose from around 50 thousand per annum to 150 
thousand per annum.4  The effect of EU enlargement was to bring immigration to the 
UK to new heights, particularly immigration for work reasons. Considering data on 
the various entry routes, Salt and Millar (2006) propose that it is likely that 2005 
recorded the largest ever entry of foreign workers to the UK. Analysing data to 2000, 
Hatton (2005) suggests that the rise in UK immigration at the end of the last decade is 
related to the adoption of a relatively liberal immigration policy, while Mitchell and 
Pain (2003) suggest the increase in UK immigration can be explained by demographic 
developments and economic factors such as incomes differentials between the UK 
and elsewhere and a favourable labour market. In any case, it seems likely that the 
recent inflow of NMS nationals to both Ireland and the UK in large part reflects the 
liberal approach taken in these countries to immigration from the NMS. It is more 
                                                 
2 For Ireland and the UK the total numbers are based on the Irish Quarterly National Household Survey 
and the UK Labour Force Survey data, the latter as reported in Blanchflower et al. (2007), which 
sample resident households at quarterly intervals. The distribution of the total across the NMS is 
derived from the distribution of Personal Public Service Numbers issued to NMS migrants in Ireland 
and applicants under the Worker Registration Scheme in the UK, both of which monitor immigration 
flows rather than the population of migrants at any particular point in time. Estimates for Sweden are 
based on the population statistics provided by the Swedish central statistical office, available to the end 
of 2005, adjusted by a scaling factor of 1.375 to reflect the magnitude of the change to 2006 quarter 3. 
Estimates for Denmark are based on the population statistics provided by the Danish central statistical 
office, available to 1 October 2006 for Poland and to 1 January 2006 for the other NMS. We assume 
that the percentage change in non-Polish NMS nationals residing in Denmark between January and 
October 2006 is similar to the percentage change in Polish nationals residing in Denmark over this 
period to arrive at the figures in Table 1.  
3 Data that became available during the write up of this work suggests that the NMS born population 
resident in Sweden rose by 9 per cent between 2005 and 2006. In light of these data the change in the 
NMS population resident in Sweden following EU enlargement May 2004 is likely to be closer to 11 
thousand rather than the 8 thousand shown in Table 1. This is still small in comparison to the 
equivalent numbers for Ireland and the UK.  
4 Total International Migration statistics, National Statistics, UK. 
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Table 1:  Change in NMS population resident in selected EU-15 countries following EU enlargement May 2004 (thousands) 
 
 
  Denmark Ireland Sweden UK  Austria Germany Italy  
Total 
emigrant 
population 
% of total 
population 
% of 
working 
age pop.  
Czech Republic 0.2            2.5 0.1 13.5 0.3 6.1 2.2 24.8 0.24 0.34
Estonia 0.2            
            
            
            
           
            
            
          
           
          
            
            
1.1 -0.1 3.0 0.0 0.8 0.3 5.2 0.39 0.57
Hungary 0.3 1.9 -0.3 8.0 0.3 6.0 2.2 18.4 0.18 0.27
Latvia 0.3 4.8 0.3 15.7 0.0 1.4 0.5 23.1 1.01 1.46
Lithuania 1.0 9.6 1.3 29.7 0.1 2.0 0.8 44.5 1.30 1.91
Poland 3.2 37.9 6.3 167.5 6.0 62.0 30.9 313.8 0.82 1.19
Slovakia 0.1 5.1 0.2 27.3 1.6 3.2 1.2 38.8 0.72 1.00
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1
 
1.2 0.4 3.1
 
0.16 0.22
 
Total NMS 5.4 62.8 8.0 265.0 9.3
 
82.7 38.5 471.7
  
% of total 
population 0.10 1.49 0.09 0.45 0.11 0.10 0.07
% of working age 
population 0.15 2.17 0.14 0.72 0.16 0.15 0.10
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Irish Quarterly National Household Survey, the UK Labour Force Survey data as reported in Blanchflower et al. (2007), Irish 
Personal Public Service Number data, the UK Worker Registration Scheme, population statistics from the Swedish and Danish central statistical offices, Austrian Labour 
Market Service data and data from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour reported in Biffl (2007) Tables 2 and 3, population statistics produced by 
the Italian National Statistics Institute, OECD International Migration Outlook 2006, foreign population statistics from the Federal Statistical Office Germany, and NiGEM 
database. Calculations are described in the text and in footnotes to the text. 
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difficult to explain the apparent differences in NMS migration to the English speaking 
countries vis-à-vis the Scandinavian countries that also operated a relatively open 
door policy following EU enlargement. Economic factors are likely to help explain 
the relative popularity of Ireland and the UK amongst NMS emigrants, but it is 
questionable whether these alone can explain the patterns observed. In 2004 
unemployment in Ireland and the UK measured just under 5 per cent. In Denmark and 
Sweden unemployment was not very different at a little over 6 per cent. The language 
may be another factor contributing to the popularity of the English speaking countries. 
We also note that immigration legislation in Denmark was more restrictive than in 
Sweden, Ireland and the UK, with work permits for NMS nationals being issued only 
for a maximum of a year (Boeri and Brücker, 2005). 
 
The data shown in Table 1 illustrate the change in the stock of NMS migrants resident 
in a number of EU-15 countries that is likely to have been associated with EU 
enlargement. This is different from the flow of NMS migrants into these countries 
associated with EU enlargement. Data on the numbers involved in migration flows 
tend to be much larger than data on the migrant population at a particular point in 
time, because many people who enter a country also leave again, sometimes quite 
quickly. This is important to point out, because the macroeconomic effects of 
migration are likely to depend also on the size of the migration flow relative to the 
stock, as we discuss in the sections below. In Ireland, 299 thousand Personal Public 
Service Numbers were allocated between May 2004 and November 2006 to NMS 
nationals. This compares to an estimate of the total number of NMS nationals resident 
in Ireland in the third quarter of 2006 of 96 thousand from the Irish Quarterly 
National Household Survey. In the UK the Worker Registration Scheme suggests that 
510 thousand NMS nationals had come to work as employees in the UK between May 
2004 and September 2006. The UK Labour Force Survey suggests that in the third 
quarter of 2006 there were 265 thousand NMS nationals resident in the UK who had 
arrived since accession (Blanchflower et al., 2007). Issues of differential coverage 
mean that the migration stock estimates provided by the Survey data and the 
immigration flow estimates provided by the registration data are not directly 
comparable. Nevertheless the differences in magnitude between the stock and flow 
data suggest that NMS migration to Ireland and the UK has been very much of a 
temporary nature, with relatively short stays before return.  
 
Data for the three countries that might have received the majority of NMS migrants 
had labour been allowed to move freely across the EU-15 is more scant, but it is 
possible to draw a number of conclusions on the basis of the available data. It seems 
likely that these countries experienced only a modest increase in migration flows from 
the NMS as a result of EU enlargement. Data from the Austrian Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Labour reproduced in Biffl (2007) Table 2 suggest that NMS 
migrants registered to work as employees in Austria at a rate of just over 1200 per 
month on average for most of 2005. It would be difficult to attribute these flows to 
EU enlargement alone, since Austria already saw significant inflows from the NMS in 
advance of accession. But, it seems quite likely that the numbers of NMS workers in 
Austria has increased more rapidly since then. From Poland alone, the number of 
wage and salary earners entering the Austrian Labour Force rose from 3328 in 2003 to 
4309 between January and mid November 2005. In addition, Austrian Labour Market 
Service data, reported in Biffl (2007) Table 3, show a near doubling of the number of 
self-employed NMS workers in Austria between 2003 and 2005, reflecting a four fold 
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rise in the number of self-employed Polish nationals and a 43 per cent rise in the 
number of self-employed Hungarian nationals. We have taken these figures to imply 
an increase of 0.16 per cent in the population of working age in Austria due to 
increased migration from the NMS, as shown in Table 1.5  
 
Italy experienced a near doubling of nationals from the NMS between January 2003 
and January 2006. Over this period the number of NMS nationals in Italy rose from 
42.2 thousand to 80.7 thousand according to the population statistics produced by the 
Italian National Statistics Institute. We assume that this increase can be attributed to 
EU enlargement.6 However, we note the general increase in foreign nationals residing 
in Italy over this period, which could be interpreted to suggest that the increase in the 
NMS population in Italy has occurred independently of EU enlargement. According 
to population statistics the foreign population in Italy rose from 1.3mn to 2.4mn from 
January 2003 to January 2006. The number of migrants from Albania and Romania 
increased by 334.7 thousand over this period, dwarfing the increase in NMS migrants.  
 
Germany has traditionally been a popular destination for Polish emigrants. The 
number of Polish nationals residing in Germany averaged 318 thousand in the years 
2001 to 2003.7 In 2004 the number of Polish nationals in Germany fell back by 35 
thousand and it is possible to speculate that Polish emigrants substituted other 
destination countries for Germany with the new possibilities that arose upon accession 
to the EU (Fihel, 2006). In 2005 the Polish population in Germany returned to its pre-
accession level in 2003. Data from the Federal Statistical Office Germany suggest that 
the foreign population fell from 7,342 thousand at the end of 2003 to 7288 thousand at 
the end of 2004, remaining virtually unchanged in 2005. It is difficult to discern from 
these data any impact of EU enlargement. For the purposes of the exercise in this 
paper we assume that net migration to Germany from the NMS increased by an 
amount proportionally similar to that calculated for Italy and Austria.  
 
Summing across the EU-15 countries listed in Table 1, it appears that the largest 
migrations from the NMS, in comparison to the population of the sending country, 
have occurred from Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia (consistent with the 
findings of Fihel et al., 2006). According to our calculations, assuming that recent 
NMS migrants are predominantly of working age as seems to be the case, 1.9 per cent 
of the Lithuanian population of working age and 1.2 per cent of the Polish population 
of working age were residing in the EU-15 at the end of 2006 due to enlargement. The 
magnitude of these shocks is not necessarily reflected in the population statistics of 
the NMS; for example, according to these the population of Poland declined by 0.04 
per cent between 2004 and 2005.8 Population numbers are of course influenced by 
many factors. One such factor may be increased immigration to some NMS from less 
affluent Eastern European countries, a process which has been underway throughout 
                                                 
5 We assume that the increase in the average monthly inflow of wage and salary earners from the 
individual NMS countries since accession is due to EU enlargement and that by the end of 2006 half of 
this additional flow had returned to their home country, not unlike the stock-flow pattern implied by the 
data for Ireland and the UK. Adding to this the increase in the stock of self-employed NMS nationals in 
Austria we arrive at the figures in Table 1.  
6 Four out of five of the additional NMS population were from Poland. We assume that the increase in 
the non-Polish NMS population is distributed between the non-Polish NMS countries according to 
population size. 
7 OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2006. 
8 Eurostat. 
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Figure 1:  NMS net emigration and GDP per head (2004) 
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Source: Net emigration as shown in Table 1; GDP per head from NiGEM database. 
 
 
Figure 2:  NMS net emigration and unemployment (2004) 
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Source: Net emigration as shown in Table 1; Unemployment rate from NiGEM database. 
 
 
the 1990s (Fihel et al., 2006). However, the discrepancy between the population 
statistics and the estimates in Table 1 may in part be the result of the temporary nature 
of migration, which could have led to a situation where people leaving the NMS 
register for work in the EU-15 without giving up residency in their home country. 
Again, a comparison of the stock data to the flow numbers available is suggestive of 
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sizeable churn. Estimates of the number of Polish nationals leaving Poland for the EU 
since accession range from 500-600 thousand (Centre for Migration Studies, Poland) 
to 1 million (Ministry of Labour, Poland). This compares to our estimate of the 
change in the stock of Polish nationals resident in the EU of a little more than 300 
thousand.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 plot net immigration from the individual NMS countries to the EU-
15, measured as a percentage of the population of working age and as shown in Table 
1, against GDP per capita and unemployment. These illustrate the correlation between 
emigration size and economic conditions in the source country. Figure 1 shows a 
negative correlation between emigration and GDP per capita. Figure 2 shows a 
positive correlation between emigration and the unemployment rate in the source 
country.9 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the largest migrations seem to have occurred from 
the poorest economies of the NMS. These countries also tend to have higher 
unemployment rates. While the emigration from the NMS that is likely to be 
associated with EU enlargement is significant from the poorer NMS, the numbers 
reported in Table 1 are not indicative of any mass migration from east to west. We 
note that the migration flow numbers associated with EU enlargement are likely to be 
substantially larger than the effects shown in Table 1.  
 
 
An illustration of macroeconomic impacts 
 
Here we illustrate the potential implications for output and inflation, unemployment, 
productivity, the current account balance, and GDP per capita of the migration 
described in Table 1 in the previous section. We analyse the impacts of migration 
using NiGEM as in, for example, Barrell et al. (2006). NiGEM is a large estimated 
quarterly model of the world economy, which uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework in 
that agents are assumed to be forward-looking but nominal rigidities slow the process 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Most countries in the OECD are modelled 
separately. The rest of the world is modelled through regional blocks: Latin America, 
Africa, East Asia, Developing Europe, OPEC and a Miscellaneous group mainly in 
West Asia. All models contain the determinants of domestic demand, export and 
import volumes, prices, current accounts and net assets, and models of the OECD 
countries are more complex than those of the non-OECD countries. Domestic 
demand, aggregate supply, and the external sector are linked through the wage-price 
system, income and wealth, the financial sector, the government sector, and 
competitiveness. The external sector links the domestic economy to the rest of the 
world. 
 
For the purposes here a brief mention of the supply side is in order. For a full 
description of NiGEM see Al-Eyd et al. (2006). In the long term output is determined 
by a CES production function with labour augmenting technical progress, and long 
run labour and capital demands are consistent with the production function. The 
labour market embodies an equilibrium level of employment. We assume that 
employers have the right to manage, and hence the bargain in the labour market is 
over the real wage. Real wages, therefore, depend on the level of trend labour 
                                                 
9 Blanchflower et al. (2007) show correlations between NMS migration flows to the UK (measured as a 
percentage of NMS source country populations) and a range of ‘well-being’ indicators in NMS source 
countries, including the unemployment rate, the employment rate and GDP per head. 
 8
productivity as well as the rate of unemployment. Wage equations are designed to be 
consistent with the production function, and include both forward and backward 
looking elements. The labour force is assumed to grow in line with the population of 
working age and any exogenous changes in the participation rate.  
 
We assume that EU enlargement changes the total population and the population of 
working age from 2004 quarter 2. We assume that the migrant stock takes 10 quarters 
to reach the levels reported in Table 1 for 2006 quarter 3. Thereafter we assume that 
the number of migrants remains constant. This is merely a working assumption. 
Clearly, we might expect to see further changes when all EU-15 countries open their 
labour markets, a process that has already begun.10 It is also possible that migration to 
the English speaking countries continues to rise. Our assumptions also imply that the 
migrant population does not necessarily grow in line with the rest of the host country 
population, which may be a reasonable assumption given the transitory nature of 
migration. Also, population projections for the majority of Central and Eastern 
European countries are flat, such that our assumptions imply a constant emigrant 
stock in proportion of the sending countries. The change in the population is 
implemented exogenously, thus we do not consider any feedback from the 
macroeconomic implications of migration to the size or direction of migration.  
 
We assume that migrants and the native populations in the receiving countries are 
equally productive and perfect substitutes, and that their productivity rises at the same 
rate over time. We assume that upon remigration to the home country individuals 
have the same productivity as natives there. An alternative interpretation of this 
assumption is that there is no remigration. We relax these assumptions in the section 
below. NiGEM is used with all its defaults in place, including forward looking 
financial markets. Results are shown for individual years 2005-9 and 2015 in Tables 
2-7. The impacts of the population changes from EU enlargement are also illustrated 
in Figure 3 for Lithuania and Poland and for Ireland and the UK. Note that these are 
not intended to illustrate the possible effects of EU enlargement per se, but rather the 
possible effects of the migration from the NMS to the EU-15 associated with EU 
enlargement. 
 
Conditional on the assumptions described above, the effect of a net increase in Polish 
emigration of around ⅓ million people of working age is to reduce output in Poland 
permanently by around 1 per cent. The reduction in output comes as a result of having 
fewer workers, but the reduction is not one for one. This is due to our assumption that 
the capital stock does not fully adjust, leaving the capital-labour ratio permanently 
higher. In the longer term, business sector capital adjusts downward to match the 
decline in the labour force. However, public infrastructures (such as transport) and the 
housing stock are assumed not to adjust fully over the time period shown. Both public 
and housing capital enter the production function and, since these do not adjust fully, 
productivity in Poland is permanently higher by around ⅓ per cent. Qualitatively the 
effects on output and productivity are similar for the other NMS countries. In Ireland 
and the UK the reverse pattern is observed. The increase in the labour force raises 
potential output, and in the longer term output rises to match this increase. As in the 
case of Poland, described above, the match is not one for one, since productivity 
changes. In Ireland and the UK productivity falls as public sector infrastructure and 
                                                 
10 See footnote 1. 
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the housing stock are assumed not to adjust fully, failing to rise to maintain the ratio 
of capital to labour. Intuitively this assumption seems more restrictive for the 
receiving countries than for the sending countries, for which it seems reasonable to 
assume that emigration would not lead to an immediate dismantling of public 
infrastructure. For the receiving countries it might seem more likely that public sector 
capital would adjust to reflect the increased population.11 If this were the case the 
effects on GDP would be larger in the EU-15 countries than our simulations suggest, 
and productivity would be less depressed. In the longer term our calculations imply 
that output in the UK is ⅔ per cent higher than it would otherwise be. In Ireland 
output is higher by 1.7 per cent reflecting mainly the bigger size of the migration 
shock.12
 
Our results also suggest that there is an effect in the short run on unemployment and 
inflation. This is because labour market equilibrium changes in the short run, due to 
adjustment costs and the assumption that migration is initially unanticipated. The 
latter seems the appropriate assumption for Ireland and the UK where changes in 
immigration from the NMS have been much larger than anticipated in advance of EU 
enlargement. In the receiving countries the assumption that the shock to migration is 
unanticipated means that the capital stock that is required for these additional workers 
is not in place when they arrive. Hence, labour demand is unchanged at given wages. 
As a consequence, new migrants either displace existing workers or become 
unemployed. Higher unemployment reduces negotiated wages and therefore the 
average wage level as compared to where it would otherwise have been. In turn, this 
allows the amount of labour demanded and the level of employment to rise (the labour 
supply curve moves down the labour demand curve). This effect on unemployment in 
the receiving countries is temporary, and eventually labour demand shifts upwards, as 
capital accumulates, and unemployment returns to its long run equilibrium rate. The 
process of adjustment also involves lower inflation in comparison to base. Lower 
wages dampen inflation temporarily and there will be a monetary response, reducing 
interest rates. Lower wages reflect lower productivity, which falls because, relative to 
capital, labour becomes more abundant and cheaper so that, for the same level of 
output, companies hire more and employment increases. As a result of higher levels 
of utilisation, the rate of return on existing capital rises. Because the rise in 
employment exceeds the initial decline in wages, household income and consumption 
rise. As consumption rises and the profitability of capital increases, companies also 
start building up the capital stock and stepping up their investment plans, but the 
capital stock increases initially at a lower rate than total output expands because 
investment plans take more time than consumption to adjust. The subsequent increase 
in the capital stock restores productivity to around its initial level or to a new steady 
state (as discussed above).  
 
 
                                                 
11 The issue of public infrastructure and housing is important. While it can and will adjust in the 
receiving countries there are temporary,  though possibly quite long lasting, effects on prices or shadow 
prices (for example, congestion). Duffy et al. (2005) find that high levels of immigration put upward 
pressure on house prices and rents reducing the benefits from coming to Ireland at the margin. It also 
has welfare implications for residents. 
12 We assume the shock is constant in absolute size after 2006 and hence represents a smaller per cent 
increase in the Irish workforce by 2015 than in 2006. 
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Figure 3:  EU enlargement and migration 
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Notes: Values shown at year end. We do not include remittances in our balance of payments estimates. 
 
 
The impact of the population changes we describe is to raise unemployment in Ireland 
by 1 percentage point on average between 2006 and 2008. In the UK unemployment 
rises by ¼ percentage point on average over this period. In both countries the rise in 
unemployment and resulting downward pressure on wages reduces inflation. In 
Ireland inflation is reduced by on average 0.7 percentage points between 2006 and 
2008. In the UK the corresponding figure is less at around 0.1 to 0.2 percentage 
points. The impact comes through more quickly in Ireland, which may reflect more 
flexible markets there than in the UK. In Ireland the reduction in inflation has 
relatively less impact on interest rates than in the UK because the ECB targets Euro 
Area inflation, which falls less than that in Ireland. The short term pattern of higher 
unemployment and lower inflation in the EU-15 countries is mirrored by lower 
unemployment and higher inflation in the accession countries, in comparison to 
base.13 On average in the years 2006 to 2008, unemployment is reduced by 0.8 
                                                 
13 Fertig (2003) reaches a similar conclusion about the pattern of unemployment effects. 
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percentage points in Lithuania and by 0.4 percentage points in Poland. The downward 
shift in unemployment is permanent for Lithuania.14  
 
The short term effects on unemployment from unanticipated migration in this analysis 
apparently contradict some studies of the relationship between migration, 
unemployment and wages (for a review see Blanchflower et al., 2007). A recent study 
of the relationship between unemployment changes and the rise in NMS migration 
across UK local authority districts fails to find any relationship between the two 
(Gilpin et al., 2006). This finding at the local level may be the result of induced 
onward migration. Hatton and Tani (2005) suggest that internal migration may be one 
of the mechanisms through which local area labour markets adjust to migration 
inflows. This would in any case explain some differences in the relationship between 
migration and unemployment at the local area level and the more aggregate level.15 
An alternative explanation is that immigrants are imperfect substitutes for native 
workers (Manacorda et al., 2006). If immigrant and native workers were 
complements, immigration might increase aggregate labour demand, also in the short 
run. Similarly, if immigrants’ skills relieve bottlenecks in the labour market, the short 
term rise in unemployment that we find for the EU-15 may be less and the long-term 
equilibrium rate of unemployment may be reduced.  
 
Indeed we note that the labour market assumptions on wage determination embodied 
in NiGEM may not be fully realistic for Ireland. The unemployment rate there has 
remained unchanged in the face of the very large migration flows. If the simulation 
results were taken at face value the Irish unemployment rate would have fallen below 
3% in the absence of EU enlargement, something that has never been experienced in 
recent times and well below the experience of other seemingly fully employed 
economies. The fact that unemployment probably did not change much, while wages 
did, could be either because of exceptional labour market flexibility, or because the 
immigrants from the NMS just displaced immigrants from other locations, such that 
the immigration at an aggregate level was anticipated. The latter may well have been 
important for Ireland where the authorities changed policy on issuing work permits to 
people from non-EU countries as a result of the influx from the NMS. Immigration 
from outside the EU fell by a small amount after enlargement, though nothing like the 
increase in immigration from the NMS. Alternatively business may have anticipated 
that immigrants would have been found from somewhere and invested accordingly. 
 
All the economies considered here can be regarded as small and open, and hence the 
change in the rate of return on capital that results from the change in the labour force 
will cause a capital inflow or outflow. This will continue until the rate of return comes 
back to world levels. For countries that are net recipients of migrants, the rise in the 
labour force for a given level of capital raises the return to capital. This causes capital 
to flow into the country and a balance of payments deficit finances the extra 
investment, which comes in advance of extra income. As illustrated in Figure 3 and in 
Table 5, the current account in Ireland and the UK deteriorates as a result of the 
migration inflow. The deterioration is more marked in Ireland not only because the 
                                                 
14 The downward shift in unemployment is also permanent for some of the other smaller and relatively 
less developed economies, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia, as our model of their labour markets 
embeds a reservation wage which rises over time, but little endogenous productivity effect, and hence a 
rise in productivity raises employment. 
15 Borjas (2003) makes a similar point. 
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Table 2:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on GDP (% difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.13  0.16 
Ireland 0.09 0.21 0.39 0.65 0.92  1.66 
Sweden 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08  0.13 
UK 0.16 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.44  0.64 
        
Austria 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10  0.17 
Germany 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06  0.14 
Italy 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07  0.09 
        
Czech Republic -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10  -0.20 
Estonia -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18  -0.25 
Hungary 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13  -0.22 
Latvia -0.12 -0.23 -0.34 -0.46 -0.54  -0.62 
Lithuania -0.19 -0.33 -0.41 -0.48 -0.56  -0.82 
Poland -0.16 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.31  -1.05 
Slovakia -0.05 -0.13 -0.22 -0.29 -0.32  -0.38 
Slovenia -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.04 
 
 
Table 3:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on inflation (% point difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.00 
Ireland -0.24 -0.66 -0.86 -0.65 -0.30  0.14 
Sweden 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05  0.01 
UK 0.07 -0.07 -0.16 -0.19 -0.16  0.01 
        
Austria -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04  0.01 
Germany -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05  0.01 
Italy -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.01 
        
Czech Republic 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00  -0.01 
Estonia 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.01  0.00 
Hungary 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00  -0.01 
Latvia 0.08 0.23 0.28 0.18 0.08  0.02 
Lithuania 0.11 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.08  -0.01 
Poland 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.15  -0.08 
Slovakia 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.01  0.00 
Slovenia 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01  0.01 
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Table 4:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on unemployment (% point difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Ireland 0.84 1.24 1.03 0.68 0.35  -0.29 
Sweden 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02  -0.02 
UK 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.10  -0.04 
        
Austria 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Germany 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00  -0.01 
Italy 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01  0.00 
        
Czech Republic -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08 -0.04  0.03 
Estonia -0.21 -0.29 -0.25 -0.21 -0.20  -0.18 
Hungary -0.10 -0.14 -0.09 -0.03 0.02  0.02 
Latvia -0.50 -0.74 -0.63 -0.53 -0.48  -0.47 
Lithuania -0.65 -0.94 -0.81 -0.73 -0.68  -0.56 
Poland -0.29 -0.45 -0.41 -0.32 -0.21  0.16 
Slovakia -0.34 -0.49 -0.41 -0.35 -0.33  -0.30 
Slovenia -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10  -0.10 
 
 
Table 5:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on the current account (% point difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02  -0.01 
Ireland -0.14 -0.32 -0.38 -0.31 -0.27  -0.47 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
UK -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12  -0.16 
        
Austria -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00  -0.01 
Germany 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02  -0.05 
Italy -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01 
        
Czech Republic 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Estonia 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07  0.01 
Hungary 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.05  -0.02 
Latvia 0.20 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.30  0.09 
Lithuania 0.21 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.15  0.05 
Poland 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.02 -0.05  -0.04 
Slovakia 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.14  0.04 
Slovenia 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03  0.02 
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Table 6:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on productivity (% difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.01 
Ireland -0.22 -0.46 -0.63 -0.72 -0.79  -0.63 
Sweden 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 
UK 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15  -0.08 
        
Austria -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05  0.00 
Germany -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  -0.02 
Italy 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 
        
Czech Republic 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.20  0.18 
Estonia 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.19  0.17 
Hungary 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.15  0.08 
Latvia 0.15 0.36 0.48 0.46 0.44  0.45 
Lithuania 0.18 0.46 0.66 0.67 0.64  0.54 
Poland 0.16 0.33 0.47 0.58 0.63  0.34 
Slovakia 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.31  0.30 
Slovenia 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09  0.09 
 
 
Table 7:  EU enlargement and migration:  
Impacts on GDP per capita (% difference from base) 
 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2015 
Denmark -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03  0.07 
Ireland -0.73 -1.15 -1.06 -0.78 -0.50  0.33 
Sweden -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.00  0.05 
UK -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 0.01  0.22 
        
Austria -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01  0.06 
Germany -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04  0.04 
Italy -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00  0.03 
        
Czech Republic 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.14  0.05 
Estonia 0.18 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.21  0.15 
Hungary 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.05  -0.03 
Latvia 0.43 0.71 0.68 0.56 0.49  0.44 
Lithuania 0.53 0.88 0.91 0.83 0.77  0.54 
Poland 0.28 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.51  -0.22 
Slovakia 0.34 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.40  0.34 
Slovenia 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13  0.12 
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shock is bigger, but because the Irish economy is more open than the UK economy. 
The NMS countries see an improvement in the current account. 
 
Table 7 illustrates the impacts of the migration flows from EU enlargement for GDP 
per capita. Following a small reduction in GDP per capita in the short term in the EU-
15 receiving countries, GDP per capita rises in the longer term.16 The reduction in the 
short term comes about as it takes some time for the capital stock to adjust to the 
inflow of labour and for the additional labour to be absorbed into employment. In the 
longer term GDP per capita rises as the population of working age increases relative 
to the population as a whole. In the NMS GDP per capita generally rises relative to 
base. The reduction in the population of working age relative to the population as a 
whole will tend to depress GDP per capita, but the rise in productivity and the 
reduction in unemployment more than offset this change.  
 
The differences in macroeconomic effects across countries reflect for the most part 
differences in the magnitude of the migration changes relative to the population of 
working age. But, there are other structural differences between economies that 
determine the profile of effects. We have already highlighted the importance of the 
composition of the capital stock. All else being equal, the larger the share of public 
sector and housing capital in the aggregate capital stock, the more pronounced the 
effect on productivity and the less pronounced the effect on GDP (remember these 
move in opposite directions). Also, the more capital intensive aggregate production is, 
the slower the economy will adjust to long run equilibrium. Other factors of 
importance include the openness of the economy, which is positively correlated with 
the magnitude of current balance effects, and the dynamics of the labour market. The 
effects of migration on unemployment will be more pronounced in countries with 
more sluggish labour markets and the effect on inflation will be less pronounced. 
 
 
Migrant labour market characteristics, learning effects and remittances 
 
In the section above we assumed that all population groups in a particular country 
exhibit the same labour market characteristics. Here we relax these assumptions. First 
we consider the assumption that the average NMS immigrant is identical to the 
average worker in the EU-15, which is clearly rejected by the available data. As 
Borjas (1999) suggests, the impacts of migration on the labour market and the 
economy depend crucially on the skill mix of immigrants versus natives in the host 
country. Second, we consider the assumption that returning migrants are identical to 
native workers in the home country. 
 
Dustman et al. (2005) suggest that the skill distribution for immigrants and natives in 
the UK are similar. However, their analysis does not extend to the period after EU 
enlargement and they do not look explicitly at recent NMS migrants. Comparing the 
occupational distribution of recent NMS migrants to recent migrants from elsewhere, 
migrants who arrived in the UK between 1998 and 2003, and the resident population, 
                                                 
16 Simulating the macroeconomic implications of recent NMS migration to the UK using the IMF’s 
Multimod, Iakova (2007) finds a similar profile over time for the effects on GDP per capita for 
different reasons than in the analysis here. There the short run reduction in GDP per capita is a result of 
productivity differentials between migrant workers (who are young) and the average native worker. 
This effect disappears over time as migrants grow older and their productivity increases.  
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Riley and Weale (2006) find that recent NMS migrants are very much concentrated in 
low skill occupations, with 62 per cent of this group working in elementary or 
process, plant and machinery occupations in comparison to 19 per cent of the 
population as a whole. This does not necessarily imply that NMS migrants are low 
skilled. Indeed, Drinkwater et al. (2006) find that Polish workers who have arrived in 
the UK since enlargement achieve significantly lower returns to their education than 
other residents. A similar pattern may be observed in Ireland. The Irish Quarterly 
National Household Survey shows that NMS nationals in Ireland are much more 
likely to be employed in production industries (outside agriculture), hotels and 
restaurants and construction than other residents. These industries typically have a 
large share of low skilled jobs. Again it is likely that the jobs immigrants take are 
below their skill levels. The studies by Barrett et al. (2006) and Barrett and McCarthy 
(2006) suggest that migrants in Ireland (particularly from non-English speaking 
countries) tend to be employed in occupations that are not commensurate to their skill 
levels, achieving significantly lower returns to their qualifications. As Fihel et al. 
(2006) point out, it is possible that the tendency for NMS migrants to take up 
relatively low skilled jobs may be the result of the transitory nature of this migration.  
 
 
Figure 4:  EU enlargement and migration: Impacts under different 
assumptions about immigrants versus natives  
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In Figure 4 we illustrate the sensitivity of the GDP and inflation impacts of migration 
in Ireland and the UK to the assumption about immigrant productivity relative to 
native productivity. We assume that the average NMS job is 74 per cent as productive 
as the average native job. This figure is calculated by comparing the employment 
weighted average of standard wage rates in three main occupation groups between 
NMS migrants and others using the UK Labour Force Survey, as reported in Riley 
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and Weale (2006). Note that we assume in this calculation that immigrants and 
natives are equally productive in the same job. If NMS workers are more productive 
than native workers in the same job, which may be the case since NMS workers in the 
same job are likely to be on average more highly skilled, our calculation may 
exaggerate the productivity differential. Our estimate of a 26 per cent productivity 
differential is within the range of figures provided by estimates of migrant pay 
penalties; for example, the pay penalty estimates for Polish workers in the UK in 
Drinkwater et al. (2006) and for non-English speaking migrants in Ireland in Barrett 
and McCarthy (2006). It is possible that the migrant pay penalty disappears over time 
as migrants adapt to the destination country and find jobs more commensurate to their 
skill levels or as migrants in temporary arrangements return to their home country. 
For simplicity we assume that all migration from the NMS is transitory and therefore 
that the pay penalty is constant over time. We also show the sensitivity of our results 
to the assumption about immigrants’ labour market participation. The data suggest 
that NMS migrants are more likely to be in the labour force than others in Ireland and 
the UK, consistent with the notion that migration is for economic reasons. For the UK 
the difference in participation rates between NMS migrants and the remaining 
population of working age is estimated at 7 percentage points. For Ireland the 
differential would appear to be larger and we assume a differential of 15 percentage 
points there.   
 
 
Figure 5:  EU enlargement and migration: Impacts under different 
assumptions about returning emigrants versus natives  
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As illustrated in Figure 4 the differential productivity assumption means that the GDP 
effect of migration is lower in both Ireland and the UK. Because migration in this 
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instance raises capacity by less than if there were identical productivity, the 
dampening effect on inflation of migration is more subdued. The need for additional 
capital is also less, since the reduction in average productivity reduces the equilibrium 
ratio of capital to labour. The impact on the current account balance is therefore more 
muted. We also illustrate the effect of higher labour market participation amongst 
migrants. This basically amplifies the shock to the labour force for a given shock to 
the population of working age, and thus the magnitudes of the effects of migration on 
inflation, GDP, unemployment and the current account balance. Note that if wages 
exhibit less downward flexibility in low skill occupations, due for example to 
minimum wages, then we might expect the unemployment effects to be larger still 
(Riley and Weale, 2006).  
 
Barrett and O’Connell (2001) and Co et al. (2000) find that the productivity of 
emigrants who return to their home country is above that of natives in the home 
country. For example, emigrants may have developed useful networks and language 
skills and learned new ways of working. In figure 5 we illustrate the GDP and 
inflation effects of the population changes in Table 1 in two NMS countries 
(Lithuania and Poland) when returnees are no different from natives (as in the 
previous section) and when returnees to the home country are 10 per cent more 
productive that natives. In this scenario we assume that the flow of returnees back to 
the home country is equal to the stock of emigrants per annum, consistent with the 
stock and flow figures observed for Poland, Ireland and the UK. In the case where 
returnees come back with enhanced productivity, the negative effect on GDP from the 
reduction in the labour force eventually reverses as the stock of more productive 
workers gradually builds up. The expansion of capacity in the longer term means that 
inflation is lower in comparison to the simple case where workers are identical.  
 
We have as yet not discussed the effects of migrants’ remittances to the home 
country. The simulations we have discussed so far assume that migrants’ remittances 
to the home country are as native’s remittances in the host country to the source 
country. Intuitively this assumption seems an unlikely description of reality. Fihel et 
al. (2006) suggest that remittances from NMS migrants are likely to be large, which 
would be consistent with the relatively transitory nature of NMS migration observed. 
Increased remittances payments from the EU-15 to NMS countries have obvious 
implications for the balance of payments. Remittances payments will increase 
household incomes in the NMS, but the effects on incomes in the EU-15 will be 
relatively small, since incomes are significantly higher there. The effect of higher 
incomes in the NMS will be reflected in higher GNP, rather than in higher GDP, and 
will tend to increase consumption in the NMS. The latter will tend to offset the 
downward effect on GDP in these countries in the short run, but should have no long 
run effect on GDP. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The immigration flows associated with EU enlargement are likely to be relatively 
small for most countries. Nevertheless, as illustrated here, there should be noticeable 
impacts in individual countries. Amongst the NMS the poorest and smallest 
economies appear to have experienced the largest population shocks. The 
concentration of recent NMS emigration in the English speaking economies suggests 
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that there are likely to be noticeable impacts there as well. However, in comparison to 
the immigration that normally occurs from countries outside the EU, the migration 
associated with the enlargement of the EU in May 2004 has so far proved modest. We 
have already noted that the UK and Italy experienced substantial increases in net 
immigration in recent years. Other EU countries, not considered here, have 
experienced similar sharp increases in migration flows in the recent past including 
Spain where the annual inflow of foreign nationals has steadily increased from 99 
thousand in 1999 to 646 thousand in 2004.17 Interestingly, Spain, like the UK, has 
experienced a period of slow productivity growth, much as might be expected on the 
basis of the simulation analysis discussed in this paper.  
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